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Availability of an Implied Civil Cause of Action
Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933
by William E. Aiken, Jr.*
I.

Introduction
A.

Background

The Securities Act of 19331. was the initial federal legislation enacted in a program to protect securities investors from fraudulent transactions, or from transactions where lack of sufficient information would
lead to uninformed decisions by prospective investors. Although the Act
is principally a disclosure Act, requiring the disclosure of certain information in a registration statement and a prospectus before securities may
lawfully be offered for sale, it also contains antifraud provisions. The
primary antifraud provision is Section 17(a) of the Act. 2
Because Section 17(a) does not expressly provide for a private right
of action, if such a right is to exist it must arise by implication. In determining whether such an implied right exists, Section 17(a) must be read
in pari mater'a with other pertinent provisions of the Act and with the
applicable provisions of other federal securities laws. The Securities Act
expressly provides for civil liability in Section 11, 3 which calls for civil
liability for faulty compliance with the registration requirements of the
*
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I Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7 a77aa (1982)) (hereinafter cited as the Securities Act or the 1933 Act).
2 Section 17(a) reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

Id § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
3 Id

§ 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
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Act, and Section 12(1), 4 which provides for civil recovery for noncompli-

ance with those requirements. In addition, Section 12(2) 5 of the Act expressly provides for a civil cause of action based upon fraudulent
activities in the general nature of those activities proscribed by Section
17(a). Section 13 of the Act 6 is a statute of limitations applicable to actions brought pursuant to Sections 11 or 12. It provides that such an
action must be brought within one year after the right thereto has been
discovered, or with reasonable diligence would have been discovered, but
in no event more than three years after the sale upon which such action
is based.
The Securities Exchange Act of 19347 supplemented the Securities
Act. Together, they provide the principal body of federal legislation governing securities transactions. In contrast to the Securities Act, which
was designed to compel disclosure and thus protect investors with regard
to the initial issuance of securities, the Exchange Act is primarily concerned with the protection of investors in the continuing trading of securities subsequent to their issuance. The Exchange Act has a number of
antifraud provisions, the principal one being Section 10(b).a Unlike Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does
not specify in detail the nature of the proscribed conduct. Instead, it
authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to promul4 Id § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
5 Section 12(2) provides as follows:
Any person who -

(2) Offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of Section 3 . . .), by the use of any means or instrumentality of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission) and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
Id § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
6 Id § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982)) (hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act or the 1934 Act).
8 Section 10(b) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).

1984]

IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION

17(A)

209

gate rules and regulations prohibiting manipulative and deceptive devices. Pursuant to such authority, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5. 9
The substantial similarity between Rule lOb-5 and Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act suggests that the Rule was essentially derived from the
antifraud provision of the earlier statute. The only significant difference
between the two is that Section 17(a) applies to conduct "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."' 0 Because the Securities Act is
primarily concerned with the issuance of securities, it imposes controls
only upon sellers. In contrast, the Exchange Act is broader in scope and
is concerned with the conduct of both parties to a securities transaction.
Like Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, neither Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act nor Rule lOb-5 contains express authorization for a civil action. It was decided early on, however, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,"
that the Exchange Act Provision and Rule gave rise to an implied private right of action. Since that time, numerous courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have reaffirmed that decision and there is
no longer any question about the, availability of a civil cause of action
under Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. l2 Given the similarity between
Rule lOb-5 and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, the question arises
whether Section 17(a) also supports a civil action, or whether the availability of civil actions under the express provisions of Section 12(2) precludes such a conclusion. The picture with respect to Section 17(a) is not
clear.
B.

Why the Availability of a Private Cause of Action under Section
17(a) is Important

One variance between Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and SEC
Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the Exchange Act, is that the Rule proscribes manipulative or deceptive conduct with respect to the purchase or
sale of securities, whereas Section 17(a) applies only with respect to the
sale (or offer for sale) of securities. Therefore, if a private action exists
under Section 17(a) it would appear to be narrower than one under Rule
9 Rule 1Ob-5 provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
10 1933 Act,supra note 1,§ 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (emphasis added); Rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) (emphasis added).
'1 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
12 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983) (existence of a private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is "simply beyond peradventure").
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lOb-5. Courts which have considered the question have generally held
that if an action is available under Section 17(a), it is limited to purchasers
of securities. Thus, if Section 17(a) gives rise to an implied private action, defrauded purchasers of securities would have a right of action
under both Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. In contrast, even if a civil action was
available under Section 17(a), defrauded sellers of securities would still be
limited to an action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
lOb-5. Given this situation, the importance of whether a civil action is
implied under Section 17(a) has been questioned.
In his oft-quoted concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. ,13 Judge Friendly doubted that a private remedy under Section 17(a)
was ever intended, but said that there seemed to be little practical point
in denying the existence of such an action once it was established that an
aggrieved buyer had a private action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Civil actions often charge violations of both Section 17(a),
and of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. While assuming without deciding
that an action is available under Section 17(a), courts have usually
avoided ruling upon the validity of the Section 17(a) claims by deciding
the actions under the Exchange Act claims. 14
The conclusion that the question is academic, however, is based
upon the presumption that the action available under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 is in every respect as broad as any action which might be
available under Section 17(a), so that an action could never be maintained under Section 17(a) which could not be maintained under Section
10(b) and the Rule. This, however, does not seem to be true. Consider
first the conduct which is prohibited. Rule lOb-5 prohibits manipulative
or deceptive conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale" of a security. Section 17(a) prohibits such conduct in "the offer or sale" of a
security. Thus, a civil action under Rule 10b-5 may be maintained by
either a buyer or seller of securities, while such an action, if it exists
under Section 17(a), does not extend to a seller because that provision
does not proscribe improper activities in the purchase of securities.i5
Thus, in this regard, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 offer a broader remedy than one which might be available under Section 17(a). Section
13 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005,
reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1970).
14 See, e.g., Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil Co., 672 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 444 (1982); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973); Katz v. Amos
Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Perhaps the main reason for the somewhat awkward development of law
under § 17(a) is the presence of Rule i0b-5. After the recognition of a private cause of action
under the Rule, cases that might have been brought under § 17(a) were instead brought under
the Rule. Even when cases were brought under § 17(a), courts often decided them under the
Rule. See, e.g., Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1982).
15 See, e.g., Gutter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.
198 1),cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, reh denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d
455, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971).
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17(a), however, refers to an "ofror sale" of securities. The Exchange Act
provisions make no mention of an offer, only of activities in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security. Although "in connection with"
could be interpreted to include preliminary negotiations, including an
offer, the Supreme Court has ruled that only a purchaser or seller may
maintain an action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.1 6 Thus, an action
is not available to one who has been defrauded by someone who has
made an offer where the offeree has not purchased or sold the security.I 7
But the language of Section 17(a) clearly encompasses, as a potential
plaintiff, an offeree in an offer to sell a security. Where the question has
been addressed, it has been recognized that if an implied right of action
exists under Section 17(a), it extends to offerees. 18 Those cases which
have held that a Section 17(a) action is available only to purchasers generally have distinguished between purchasers and sellers 19 and have not
considered the availability of the action to offerees.
A more important distinction between an action under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and a potential action under Section 17(a) involves
the issue of scienter. For years, a battle raged as to whether a showing of
scienter was required in a civil action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.20 Although questions remain concerning what constitutes the requisite scienter, the Supreme Court laid the basic question to rest in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder.2 ' In Hochfelder, the Court held that negligence was an
insufficient ground for a civil action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Allegations of the defendant's scienter are an essential element of such an
action. The Court based its holding on the language of Section 10(b),
the
not the language of the Rule, stating that the narrower language of
22
statutory section constrained the reach of the broader Rule lOb-5.
The law regarding the requirement of showing scienter in a Section
17(a) private action (presuming that one exists) is not so distinct. A
number of courts have ruled on the question and, with some exceptions,2 3 most have held that some form of scienter is necessary to support
16See Blue Chip Stamps v.
(1975).
17 Id.
18 See Reid v. Madison, 438
tries, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.
19 See, e.g., Gutter v. Merrill

Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh g denied, 423 U.S. 884

F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1977); Wulc v. Gulf& Western IndusPa. 1975).
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909, reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982).

20 Compare Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974); Hoover v.
Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (scienter needed) with Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504
(7th Cir. 1965); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422
F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970),cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.
1961) (scienter not needed).
21 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
22 Id at 212-14. See also Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.
1982).
23 See, e.g., SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978) (injunction may
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an action based upon an alleged violation of Section 17(a). 2 4 A showing
of negligent conduct is said to be insufficient. 25 For the most part, however, these decisions were handed down prior to the Supreme Court decision in Aaron v. SEC. 26 Although not addressing the specific questions
under discussion in this article, the Court in that case was faced with the
question of whether the SEC was required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5 under the Exchange Act, and Section 17(a) under the
Securities Act. While deciding that a showing of scienter was a necessary
prerequisite under the Exchange Act, the position of the Court was split
as to Section 17(a), depending upon which of the three paragraphs of
that Section was considered. In the view of the Court:
The language of § 17(a) strongly suggests that Congress contemplated a scienter requirement under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2)
or § 17(a)(3). The language of § 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful "to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," plainly evinces an
intent on the part of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional
misconduct. Even if it be assumed that the term "defraud" is ambiguous, given its various meanings at law and in equity, the terms "device,"
"scheme," and "artifice" all connote knowing or intentional
practices ...
By contrast, the language of § 17(a)(2), which prohibits any person
from obtaining money or property "by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact," is devoid of any
suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement ...
Finally, the language of § 17(a)(3), under which it is unlawful for
any person "to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added)
quite plainly focuses upon the efct of particular conduct on members of
the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person
responsible ...
It is our view, in sum, that the language of § 17(a) requires
scienter
27
under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3).
Although the Supreme Court resolved the issue only with respect to

SEC enforcement issues, it is doubtful that a different interpretation
be issued against violation of § 17(a) based on negligent conduct); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.
Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
24 See Cleary v. Perfecture, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (lst Cir. 1983); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Schweikart, 413 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Vacca v. Intra Mgmt. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Malik v. Universal Resources
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 350 (S.D. Cal. 1976); Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
25 See Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Republic Technology Fund v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 411 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Smith v. Manausa,
385 F. Supp. 443 (E.D. Ky. 1974). See also United States v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1982);
Odette, 394 F. Supp. 94 (reckless disregard for truth constitutes scienter); Cleag, 700 F.2d 774
(scienter under § 17(a) same as scienter under Rule 10b-5).
26 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
27 Id at 695-97.
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28
would be given if an implied private cause of action is found to exist.
This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision in Hochfelder where
it held that a showing of scienter is an essential element of an action
under the Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The Court, by
basing its decision on the statutory provision rather than the Rule, and
by expressly pointing out that the narrower language of the statute constrained the reach of the broader Rule lOb-5, strongly suggests that the
Rule itself, without the constraint of the authorizing statute, would be
sufficiently broad to support a civil action without a showing of scienter.
In the case of the Securities Act, the statutory provision is substantially
identical to the Exchange Act Rule and is not similar to Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, therefore, an argument can be made that a showing of
scienter would not be an essential element of a civil action under Section
17(a). Such a conclusion would not be inconsistent with Hocfelder.
As to actions under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), it appears that a
showing of scienter would not be necessary. In view of the existence of
such a requirement under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Section 17(a)
would be an attractive, viable alternative to some actions previously
29
brought under the Rule, particularly as to actions based on negligence,
provided that such an action exists.
Punitive damages may be another area in which 17(a) may offer an
advantage over Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. It is well established that
such damages are not available under Section 10(b). 30 These decisions,
however, are based on Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act 3 ' which limits
recovery under that Act to "actual damages." Courts have consistently
32
held that such provision precludes the recovery of punitive damages.
The Securities Act has no corresponding provision. Nevertheless, in
those cases in which the question has been considered, courts usually
have held that punitive damages are also unavailable under Section
17(a). 33 Courts have stated that to permit punitive damages under Section 17(a) but not under Section 10(b) would create "an unreasoned split
between buyers and sellers of securities subjected to fraud of an equally
heinous nature."'34 However, given the limited number of cases in relatively few circuits which have addressed the issue, it cannot be regarded
as a closed question.
28 See Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).
29 Id

30 See, e.g., Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins, & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1977); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
31 1934 Act, supra note 7, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).

32 See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
33 See, e.g., DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1971); Globus v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Gross v.
Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Greitzer v. U.S. Nat'l Bank,
326 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
34 Globus, 418 F.2d at 1286.
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In view of the probable difference in scienter requirements between
Section 10(b) actions under the Exchange Act and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, it appears that the existence or non-existence of a private
right of action under Section 17(a) is a significant question.
II.

Considerations
A.

Generaly

The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act gives rise to an implied right of action. On two occasions
the Court has expressly declined to do so. 35 Thus, in determining
whether such a right exists, one must look to guidance from the Court in
a general sense, derived from decisions bearing upon the right to a civil
action under other federal statutes, and to lower court decisions.
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a decided trend away from
recognizing an implied private cause of action based upon statutes which
are silent on the question of civil remedies. 36 The test currently applied,
as established in Cor v. Ash ,37 is said to be more restrictive than any of its
predecessors. 38 Prior to Cor v. Ash, the Court implied a private cause of
action absent evidence of Congressional authorization or acquiescence,
on the theory that such remedies were necessary to vindicate important
federal interests. 39 Such decisions appeared to rest on the presumption
that a civil damage remedy ordinarily would be inferred from a blanket
statutory prohibition, unless there was some persuasive indication that
Congress intended existing remedies and procedures to be exclusive. 40 In
a substantial retreat from its previous liberal position, the Supreme
Court in Cor v. Ash set forth four factors which must be considered in
determining whether a private action may be implied from a federal statute. These factors are:
(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted; that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor

of the plaintiff?
35 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975) ("We express
no opinion, of course, on whether Section 17(a) in light of the express civil remedies of the 1933
Act gives rise to an implied cause of action"); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980).
36 See Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982); Hill v. Der,
521 F. Supp. 1370, 1374 (D. Del. 1981). See generaly Note, Implied Private Rights of Actton Under
FederalStatutes: CongressionalIntent ,judicialDeference, or MutualAbdzcatton, 50 FORD. L. REV. 611

(1982).
37 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
38 Landg, 688 F.2d at 388. Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964)(Private
right of action under 1934 Act, supra note 7, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), exists because
necessary "to make effective the Congressional purpose").
39 See, e.g., Borak, 377 U.S. at 432-33. See generally Hazen, Implied Remedes Under Federal
Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium - Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1333, 1346-58 (1980).

40 Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200 (1967); Hill v. Der, 521 F.
Supp. 1370, 1375 (D. Del. 1981) (citing United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192
(3d Cir. 1980)).
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(2) Is there any indication of the legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate
4
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?

In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redngton,42 the Court further explained that
although all four factors were relevant, they were not necessarily entitled
to equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended
43
to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.
Because the Securities Act has provisions calling for express civil remedies, two further pronouncements of the Supreme Court are important to
the present analysis. In Touche Ross & Co., the Court expressed reluctance to imply a cause of action "that is significantly broader than the
remedy that Congress chose to provide,"' 44 and in TransamericaMortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewt's, 45 the Court emphasized the "elemental canon of
remedy
statutory construction that where a statute provides a particular
' 46
it.
into
others
reading
of
wary
be
must
court
a
remedies,
or
Does Section 17(a) give rise to a civil cause of action under the Cori v.
Ash test? Because Section 17(a) was enacted to protect securities investors from fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, offerees and purchasers of securities are members of a class for whose benefit the section
was created. 47 Accordingly, the first element of the four pronged test
established by the Supreme Court in Cort is satisfied. That a statutory
provision has been enacted to protect a particular class does not necessarily mean, however, that Congress intended that provision to be enforced
through private litigation. 48 There must be some objective indication of
congressional intent to create a private action. If such an intent can be
found, the right of action should be recognized because the fourth conAsh, 422 U.S. at 79.
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
Id at 569.
Id. at 574.
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
46 Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19. In Hill, 521 F. Supp at 1375-76, the court noted that the
Supreme Court has refused to find a private cause of action in virtually every case it has considered in recent years under the Ash test. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (no implied private right of action under § 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act); Univs. Research Ass'n v. Coutrix, 450 U.S. 754, 784
(1981) (no implied private right of action under § 1 of the Davis-Bacon Act); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (no implied private right of action
under § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
578 (1978) (no implied private right of action under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (no implied private right of action under § 1302 of the
Indian Civil Rights Act); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977) (no
implied private right of action for unsuccessful tender offerors under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act).
See generally Note, supra note 36.
47 See Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (D. Del. 1981); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp.
26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48 See Hill, 521 F. Supp. at 1376-78.
41
42
43
44
45
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sideration specified by the Supreme Court is met: securities regulation is
not an area of the law traditionally relegated to the states or one basically of concern to the states.
To determine the intent of Congress as expressed a half century ago,
one must look to the legislative history and the structure of the Securities
Act. Both of these are considered in the subdivisions immediately
following.
B.

Arguments Against Imph'ed Action

Of the meager legislative history available for consideration, most
supports the conclusion that no implied private action under Section
17(a) was intended by Congress. In Basile v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 49 the court pointed out that, "in listing the sections of the
Securities Act that create and define civil liability the House Committee
Report noted only Sections 11 and 12." 50 The report added that "[T]o
impose a greater responsibility. . . would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious administration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the public." 51 Thus, the court concluded that the legislative
history reveals no congressional intent to create an implied right of action. 52 In agreement, the Fifth Circuit has stated: "The legislative history of the 1933 Act makes no mention of civil liability under Section
17(a); congressional discussion of civil liability under the Act centers on
Sections 11 and 12. ' 'Sa In Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking Co. ,'54 the
court, without specifically identifying authority, states: "The argument,
based on legislative history and statutory construction, is persuasive that
Section 17(a) was intended only to afford a basis for injunctive relief and,
if willfulness is present, for criminal liability, and was not intended to
provide a civil remedy for damages supplementing that afforded by Sec'' 5
tion 12(2).
An additional means of obtaining insight on the congressional intent is provided by Professor Loss in his treatise on Securities Law. Professor Loss points out that in November 1933, Commissioner Landis of
the Federal Trade Commission, who is said to have played a prominent
part in the drafting of the Securities Act, stated in an address:
The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil liabilities arise from
a violation of Section 17, the first subsection of which makes unlawful
the circulation of falsehoods and untruths in connection with the sale of
49 551 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
50 Id. at 586. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933) (hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT).
51 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 9-12.

52 Basile, 551 F. Supp. at 587.
53 Landty, 688 F.2d at 389 (citing HOUSE REPORT,sUpra note 50, at 9-10). See also Hill, 521

F. Supp. at 1376-78; Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060, 1067-70 (E.D. Ky.
1980).
54 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971).
55 Der, 336 F. Supp. at 904.
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a security in interstate commerce or through the mails. But a reading of
this section in the light of the entire Act leaves no doubt but that violations of its provisions give rise only to a liability to be restrained by inor, if wilfully done, to a liability to be punished
junctive action
56
criminally.

The strongest argument against an implied private action under
Section 17(a) stems from the construction of the Securities Act as a
whole. The Act contains provisions expressly providing for civil actions
under certain circumstances which fall within the purview of Section
17(a). The Act also places limitations and restrictions on the maintenance of such private actions. If a private action is implied under Section 17(a), it would appear to render Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
largely unnecessary, and would permit the limitations and restrictions
placed upon private actions under the express provisions to be avoided
by the simple expedient of maintaining an action under the implied authority of Section 17 instead of the express authority of Section 12. It is
unlikely that Congress would have intended by implication to emasculate the provisions it expressly set forth in the statute.
At a relatively early date, Professor Loss succinctly articulated this
argument. After noting that it was established that Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act supports an implied private action, he posed the question
whether there was similar justification for implying a private action
under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. His response was as follows:
It is one thing to imply a private right of action under § 10(b) or the
other provisions of the 1934 act, because the specific liabilities created by
§§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 do not cover all the variegated activities with
which that act is concerned. But it is quite another thing to add an
implied- remedy under § 17(a) of the 1933 act to the detailed remedies
specifically created by §§ 11 and 12. The 1933 act is a much narrower
statute. It deals only with disclosure and fraud in the sale ofsecurities. It
has but two important substantive provisions, §§ 5 and 17(a). Non-compliance with § 5 results in civil liability under § 12(1). Faulty compliance results in liability under § 11. And § 17(a) has its counterpart in
§ 12(2). It all makes a rather neat pattern. Within the area of §§ 5 and
17(a), §§ 11 and 12 (unlike §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the 1934 act) are allembracing. This is not to say that the remedies afforded by §§ 11 and 12
are complete. But the very restrictions contained in those sections and
the differences between them - for example, the fact that § 11 but not
§ 12 imposes liability on certain persons connected with the issuer without regard to their participation in the offering and the fact that § 12(2)
does not go so far in relation to § 17(a) as § 12(1) goes in relation to § 5
- make it seem the less justifiable to permit plaintiffs to circumvent the
limitations of§ 12 by resort to § 17(a). Particularly is this so in view of
the fact that § 11, together with the statute of limitations in § 13,5 7was
actually tightened in the 1934 amendments to the Securities Act.
56 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1784-85 (2d ed. 1961), citing Landis, Lta2bzlity Seeti'ons of the Securities Act, 18 AM. ACCT. 330, 331 (1933).
57 3 L. Loss, supra note 56, at 1785 (2d ed. 1961). This evaluation by Professor Loss has
frequently been cited by the courts in decisions denying a § 17(a) private right of action. See,
e.g. ,Iil, 521 F. Supp at 1376-77; Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060, 1069 (E.D.
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Notwithstanding that a number of courts have held that Section 17(a)
does support an implied private action, Professor Loss' analysis seems to
have continued vitality.
C. Arguments for an Imph'ed Action
The principal argument in favor of an implied action under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act is that the section is substantially identical to
SEC Rule lOb-5, and it now is well established that the Rule, in conjunction with its underlying statutory provision, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, supports such an implied action. Therefore, it would be
inconsistent to deny a private action under Section 17(a). This argument
has been the basis of judicial decisions which have held that such an
action does exist. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
the language of Section 17(a) is broad enough to imply a private right of
action, and is more specific than Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
58
under which a private right of action has commonly been approved.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has said that in light of the
minimal differences between Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, arguments in favor of an implied action
5 9
under Section 17(a) are persuasive.
Other arguments in favor of an implied action under Section 17(a)
are rather passive. It has been said that such an action exists because
Section 17(a) is broad enough to imply it, 60 or that the action is to be
implied because the section makes the prohibited conduct unlawful. 61 In
addition, there is the "why not" argument, set forth by Judge Friendly in
his concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ,62 which states
that since an implied action is recognized under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, there is little point in denying one under Section 17(a). As
previously discussed, this argument presupposes that, assuming the existence of an action under Section 17(a), any action which could be
brought thereunder also might be brought under Section 10(b). That
supposition no longer appears valid in light of the developments concerning scienter requirements which have evolved since Judge Friendly made
his comments.
Ky. 1980); Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1287 (D. Kan. 1980); Dyer,
336 F. Supp. at 904.
58 See Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1233, 1245 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'don other
grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
59 Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981). As discussed
earlier, see supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text, § 17(a) of the 1933 Act is not closely similar
to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, but it is substantially identical to Rule lOb-5, which, as a regulation
promulgated under § 10(b), might effectively be regarded as part of that section.
60 See Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909

(1979); Daniel, 561 F.2d at 1245.
61 Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
62 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1970). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Some have suggested that a limited private action should be available under Section 17(a) to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the
private remedies expressly provided by the Act. Under the express recovery provisions of Section 12 of the Act, an action may be brought based
upon conduct of the defendant which does not amount to fraud. Hence,
it is argued, if a civil action under Section 17(a) requires proof of fraud, it
does not duplicate the remedy offered by Section 12. Only Section
17(a)(1) and Section 17(a)(3) inherently require fraud for violations to be
found; Section 17(a)(2), by its terms, does not. 63 Section 17(a)(2) can be
violated by the negligent use of misinformation. Thus, it has been concluded by a limited number of courts that Section 17(a) should be regarded as giving rise to an implied right of action under paragraphs (1)
and (3) without such action being subject to the limitations which are
applicable to private actions under Section 12 of the Act; but to the extent that a private right of action exists under paragraph (2), it would be
subject to such limitations. 64 Therefore, it is argued that an implied private action exists under Section 17(a)(1) and Section 17(1)(3), but not
under Section 17(a)(2).
An additional argument in favor of implying a private action under
Section 17(a) may be derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston.65 In Huddleston, the Court considered the
question whether purchasers of registered securities who allege that they
were defrauded by misrepresentations in a registration statement may
maintain an action under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act notwithstanding the express remedy for misstatements and omissions in registration statements provided by Section 11 of the Securities Act.
Distinguishing between the scopes of the two provisions and pointing out
that scienter is a necessary element of a Section 10(b), but not of a Section 11 violation, the Court held that the action under Section 10(b)
could be maintained. Conceding that the same conduct on the part of a
defendant could sometimes give rise to rights of action under both statutory provisions, even though the burdens placed on the plaintiff would
not be the same, the Court said that since Section 10(b) and Section 11
address different types of wrongdoing, it saw no reason to carve out an
exception to Section 10(b) for fraud occurring in a registration statement
just because the same conduct may be actionable under Section 1 1.66
The decision of the Supreme Court in Huddleston may seem initially
to be inconsistent with the previously discussed position that no implied
63 Compare 1933 Act, supra note 1, §§ 17(a)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g(a)(l), (3) with 1933
Act, supra note 1, § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(2). This conclusion is entirely consistent with
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The Court in Aaron
held that scienter was an element of a cause of action under § 17(a)(1), but not under § 17(a)(2)
or § 17(a)(3). See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
64 See Wulc v. Gulf & Western Indus., 400 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Dorfman v.
First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
65 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
66 Id. at 687-90.
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action under Section 17(a) should be recognized because it would enable
a plaintiff to bypass the provisions of the ,Securities Act which expressly
establish civil actions. Further examination shows two essential differences, however, between the question being analyzed in this article and
the question addressed by the Court in Huddleston. First, the Court in
Huddleston was considering whether express remedies of one statute precluded the application of implied remedies from another statute. This
should not be heavily emphasized, however, since the Court regarded the
two Acts as constituting "interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities." '67 Nevertheless, it remains a legitimate consideration.
The second difference is of greater importance. The present analysis
concerns whether a private right of action should be implied for Section
17(a). That basic question remains unresolved. In contrast, in Huddlesion, the Court started with the unquestioned fact that Section 10(b) does
give rise to such a right. The Court stated, "The existence of this implied
remedy is simply beyond peradventure. ' '68 The Court was determining
only whether, recognizing the existence of such a right of action, that
right should be permitted to be applied where an express remedy was
also provided. In the words of the Court: "It would be anomalous indeed if the special protection afforded to purchasers in a registered offering by the 1933 Act were deemed to deprive such purchasers of the
protection against manipulation and deception that Section 10(b) makes
available to all persons who deal in securities." '69 Thus, the Court seems
to be saying that where two remedies generally are available to securities
investors, an investor should not be deprived of one remedy which covers
his situation, merely because the situation also is covered by another
remedy. It is a logical argument for the situation which faced the Court
in Huddleston, but it is not relevant to the instant question. Huddleson
does not mandate, nor even suggest that a private action should be rec70
ognized under Section 17(a).
III.

Judicial Decisions
A.

Generally

The judicial decisions on the question addressed herein have not
been uniform. 71 The courts in the Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have held that a private action does exist under Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, while those in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits have held that there is no such private right of action.
67 Id at 686 (quoting Hohfe/der, 425 U.S. at 206).
68 Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. at 687.
69 Id at 688.
70 See id.
at 686 & 686 n.9.
71 "Courts are split on whether Section 17(a) provides an implied private right of action
for damages. Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit [Court of Appeals] has addressed
the issue." Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Mass. 1982).
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The courts of appeals have not ruled on the question in all circuits. The
results have varied in the Third Circuit, with no ruling from the court of
appeals, and no court in the Eleventh Circuit has yet considered the
72
question.
The trend appears to be toward holding that there is no implied
private action under Section 17(a). For some time the courts, to some
extent relying upon Judge Friendly's dictum,

73

held or assumed that

such a right of action existed, largely because it did not seem to make
much difference. 7 4 In some jurisdictions the right is recognized without
having been subjected to strict scrutiny. 75 Other courts have held that
the right exists on the grounds previously discussed, (z>e., Section 17(a) is
substantially identical to SEC Rule 10b-5 under which an action does
exist). 7 6 Such holdings, however, almost invariably have been made pur77
suant to very limited consideration of the question.
The courts which have held that no private action may be implied
under Section 17(a) have generally concluded that because the Securities
Act contains express provisions calling for private actions, it would frustrate the congressional purpose in enacting the express provisions to superimpose an implied right. 78 In this regard, the court in Landy v. All
American Assurance Co. 79 commented as follows:
The Securities Act of 1933 contains two express civil liabilities [provisions] for the protection of purchasers. The first of these is § 11 which
prohibits falsehoods and omissions in the registration statement. The
second is § 12(2) which protects purchasers from misstatements or omissions in written or oral communications. Together these sections confer
specific private rights upon purchasers. Before a purchaser may successfully bring suit under either of these two sections, however, strict procedural requirements must first be satisfied. Section 17(a)(2) prohibits the
same type of conduct as §§ 11 and 12, but has none of the limitations
imposed by Congress. The creation of an implied cause of action [under]
§ 17(a) under these circumstances would effectively frustrate the care72 See infra notes 82-120 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of the positions
taken by the courts of appeals and district courts.
73 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74 See 6 L. Loss, supra note 56, at 3913-14 (2d ed. Supp. 1969).
75 See, e.g., Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332, 333, quoting Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d
97, 99 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhis circuit is committed to the rule that § 17(a) supports a private
damage claim"); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
76 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II,
Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981); Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.
1977), rev'don other grounds, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
77 See Basile v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 551 F. Supp. 580, 585 (S.D. Ohio'
1980):
It is true that the Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that
section 17(a) provides a private right of action. They, however, did so with a
minimum of discussion; the most marked characteristic of all these decisions is the
total absence of the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court for any case raising
the issue of whether Congress intended that a private cause of action be implied.
See also Landy, 688 F.2d at 384.
78 See Landgy, 688 F.2d at 389-91; Basile, 551 F. Supp. at 585-87; Freeman v. McCormack,
490 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
79 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).
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In holding that no private action may be implied under Section 17(a),
some courts also have looked to the trend in Supreme Court decisions
regarding implied actions under federal statutes. 8 1 In addition, there are
decisions falling within the two extremes in which it effectively has been
held that a private action exists under Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3), but
not under Section 17(a) (2).
B.

Positions Taken by the Ctrcuits

The following is a brief summary of the position taken in the several
circuits with respect to the question addressed herein. This discussion is
not exhaustive as to authority in each circuit, but an attempt has been
made to collect and analyze the recent decisions to reflect the current
position taken by the courts.
FIRST CIRCUIT:
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on whether Section
17(a) gives rise to an implied right of action. The district courts in
Maine,8 2 Massachusetts, 8 3 and New Hampshire, 4 however, have ruled
in the negative. The initial district court decision in the circuit, Dyer v.
Eastern Trust and Banking Co. ,85 was based on the court's evaluation of
congressional intent, as reflected in the structure of the Securities Act.
The subsequent decisions were reached with minimal analysis, but are
consistent with the Dyer holding.
SECOND CIRCUIT:
In Kirshner v. United States,8 6 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the language of Section 17 of the Exchange Act is broad
enough to imply a private right of action. Prior to the Kirshner decision,
there was a split of authority among the district courts in the circuit. 87
None of the cases which have held that the action exists contain a significant analysis of the question.
THIRD CIRCUIT:
There is no Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on whether an
implied private right of action arises out of the proscriptions of Section
80 Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted).
81 See id. at 387-89; Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (D. Mass. 1982).
82 Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971).
83 Massara v. Vernitron Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Mass. 1983); Kaufman v. Magid,
539 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Mass. 1982).
84

Manchester Bank v. Conn. Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1304 (D.N.H. 1980).

85 336 F. Supp. 890, 903-05 (D. Me. 1971).
86 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
87 Compare Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F.

Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (§ 17(a) supports a private right of action) with Allegaert v. Perot, 78
F.R.D. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Scarafotti v. Bache & Co., 483 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Person v. N.Y. Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir.
1977); Architectural League of N.Y. v. Bartos, 404 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Welch Foods,
Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (§ 17(a) does not support a
private right of action).
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17(a) of the Securities Act. The Third Circuit district courts do offer,
however, two well reasoned opinions which present contrasting conclusions. In Hill v. Der,88 the court traced the evolution of the Supreme
Court decisions on the general question of implied actions arising from
federal statutes and applied its conclusions to Section 17(a). In view of
the civil remedies provided in the Act, the court concluded that none was
intended under Section 17(a). In addition to looking to Sections 11 and
12, the court looked to Sections 20 and 24 of the Act to show that Congress had considered sanctions against violators from every angle. The
court stated:
[U]nder § 24 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x, willful violations of
the Act are punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. Similarly, § 20,
15 U.S.C. § 77t, authorizes the SEC to bring civil actions in federal
court to enjoin existing or imminent violations of the provisions of the
Act, including § 17(a). These compliance measures when juxtaposed
with the civil remedies contained in §§ 11 and 12 make it unlikely that
Congress "absentmindedly" omitted an intended civil remedy under

§ 17(a).8 9

The court in Dorfman v. First Boston Corp. 90 held that Section 17(a) does

give rise to a civil action for fraud under paragraphs (1) and (3), independent of the restrictions and limitations applicable to Section 12.
An action alleging violations of Section 17(a)(2), on the other hand,
would be subject to such restrictions and applications. Subsequently, in
Wulc v. Gulf& Western Industries, Inc. 91 the court cited and accepted the
position taken in Dorfman.
In B & B Investment Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 92 the dichotomy between
Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3), and Section 17(a)(2) was again recognized, but with different consequences. In B & B Investments, the court
held that a private tight of action exists under Section 17(a), but added
that while a valid claim may be stated under Section 17(a)(1) and Section 17(a)(3) without allegations of privity, a claim under Section
17(a)(2) is subject to the limitations of Section 12. 93 Finally, to round
out the varying positions taken by the district courts in the Third Circuit,
in Cromwell v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co., 9 4 the court merely
stated, without extended discussion, that Section 17 does give rise to a
private cause of action. It should be noted, however, that this decision
preceded the Wulc decision in the same district.
FOURTH CIRCUIT:
88 521 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Del. 1981).
89 Id. at 1377 (footnotes omitted).
90 336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

91 400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
92 391 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
93 Id at 726.
94 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp 476 (E.D.
Pa. 1983), a recent decision where the court, after reviewing the authorities, held that no private
action was available under § 17(a).
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In Newman v. Pr'or9 5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
that circuit is committed to the rule that Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act supports a private damages claim for the fraudulent sale of a
96

security.

FIFTH CIRCUIT:
Although there was a split of opinion among the district courts, the
majority of decisions have held that Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
does not give rise to an implied right of action. 9 7 Any question as to the
law in the circuit on the question, however, was resolved by the court of
appeals in Landry v. All American Assurance Co.98 In Landry, the court held
that no such private action is available. The court looked to the
Supreme Court's general position on implied actions and the overall
structure of the Act and concluded that:
[I]t would appear that the Cori test as applied to § 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 points away from the implication of a private cause of action. This, together with the Supreme Court's conservative interpretation of the test in recent years, leads us to the conclusion that the district
court correctly dismissed this theory of relief.9 9

SIXTH CIRCUIT:
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on the availability
of a private action under Section 17(a), and the status of the question is
not completely clear from the district court decisions. The circuit can be
considered, with reasonable confidence, however, to be in the camp of
the jurisdictions which reject the proposition that such an action is available. The district courts handed down several decisions in which the
question was addressed over the two year period from 1980 to 1982. In
1980, the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky noted that
the question is basically one of statutory construction. 00 The court said
that Section 17(a) simply proscribes certain conduct. If Congress had
wanted to create a civil remedy for damages within that section it could
expressly have done so. The statutory language does not evidence any
congressional intent to provide a private suit for damages, and Congress
did not provide an alternative means of securing relief for its violations.
Accordingly, the court held that Section 17(a) does not provide for an
95 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975).
96 Id. at 50. See also Reid v. Madison, 438 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Va. 1977).
97 See Keys v. Wolfe, 540 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Tex. 1982); In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp.

Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Martin v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Fredericks,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. La. 1980); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Genter v. Hutcheson, 433 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Ga. 1977); Ferland v. Orange Groves of Fla., Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Fla. 1974); Cowsar v. Regional Recreations, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 394 (C.D.
La. 1974). But see Fells v. Nat'l Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Kirk v.
First Nat'l Bank, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (C.D. Ga. 1977).
98 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).
99 Id at 391. The court referred to the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
100 See Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Ky. 1980).

1984]

IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION

17(A)

225

implied private cause of action.10 1 In 1981, the court in State of Ohio v.
Crofters 102 rendered a half-hearted decision in favor of recognizing the
action. The court said: "We are inclined at this point in the case to
follow the majority of circuit courts in finding that an implied private
cause of action exists under [Section 17(a)]."' 10 3 A year later, however,
the same court analyzed the question and came to the opposite conclusion. In Basile v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 104 the court
pointed out that the legislative history of the Securities Act did not support a finding of Congressional intent to create an implied action under
Section 17(a), and that the structure of the Act was convincing evidence
of the absence of such an intent. To imply a private cause of action
under Section 17(a) would be to create judicially a broader remedy than
05
that expressly provided by Congress in Sections 11 and 12 of the Act.'
In holding that there is no such implied action, the court conceded that
the courts of appeals in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
had held that Section 17(a) does provide an implied private action, but
commented that they did so with a minimum of discussion and without
10 6
the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court for such holdings.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that an implied
right of action under Section 17(a) is available on the ground that the
section is broad enough to support such an implication, 0 7 implicitly
overruled contrary prior district court decisions.' 0 8 The court did not
consider the effect of the provisions of the Act expressly providing for
civil remedies.
EIGHTH CIRCUIT:
In Shull v. Damn, Kalman & Quail, Inc. 1o9 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held without discussion that Section 17(a) gives no private cause
0
of action. "1
NINTH CIRCUIT:
Early district court decisions in the Ninth Circuit generally held
that no implied private action exists under Section 17(a),' " although in
101Id

at 1070.

102 525 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Ohio 1981).

103 Id.at 1140.
104 551 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
105 Id at 587.
106 Id. at 585.
107 Daniel v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.),rev'don other grounds, 439 U.S.
551 (1977). See also Frischling v. Priest Oil & Gas Corp., 524 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. I1. 1981);
Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
108 Id at 1245. The decisions overruled were Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp.
1270 (N.D. I1. 1976); Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. 11. 1981).
109 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1977).
110 Id at 159. See also Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 442 F. Supp. 981 (D. Neb.

1977).
111 See, e.g., McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
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some instances the courts took qualified positions." 2 Court of appeals
decisions on the question recognize a private action, although the conclusion that such is the rule in the circuit may be subject to some question.
In Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd. 1 3 the court held that the right of
action exists on the basis of the minimal difference between Section 17(a)
and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. In Kramas v. Security Gas & 0i,
Inc. ,ii4 the court stated that it assumed such a private action to be available, but expressly declined to rule on the question, stating that it was
not properly before the court. In a later district court decision, Zatkin v.
Pri'muth,i 15 the court pointed out that the Kramas decision may cast
doubt on the earlier Ninth Circuit decision in Stephenson. Hence, the
existence of a private action under Section 17(a) in the Ninth Circuit
may be in doubt, but the existing authority continues to support the position that the right of action does exist.
TENTH CIRCUITThe Court of Appeals in the Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the
availability of an implied civil action under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. Two district courts in that circuit have considered the question,
however, and have concluded that the section will not support such an
action. In Freeman v. McCormack,ii6 the court granted summary judgment
declaring that no such action exists. The court noted that those activities
which constitute both a violation of Section 17(a)(2) and Section 12(2) of
the Act may be prosecuted by private civil action pursuant to the authority granted by Section 12 of the Act. 1 7 It noted, however, that there are
portions of Section 17(a) not encompassed by the scope of private civil
actions under Section 12, which indicates that Congress did not intend to
permit suits based on those activities. Accordingly, the court concluded
that Section 17(a) does not imply any private right of action." 8
In Woods v. Home &Structures, Inc. , 19 the court observed what it regarded as fallacious reasoning of courts which had held that Section
17(a) gives rise to a private action. The court noted that, given the almost identical language of Rule lOb-5 and Section 17(a) and the broader
scope of Rule lOb-5, some courts have seen no practical point in denying
the existence of a private action under Section 17. The court stated,
however, that the practical significance of denying a private right of ac112 See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal.
1976)(Section 17(a) private action held unavailable, at least to the extent that it would duplicate the implied private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act); Demoe v. Dean Witter &
Co., 476 F. Supp. 275 (D. Alaska 1979)(Section 17(a) private action held available only under

§

17(a)(3) and not under § 17(a)(1) or § 17(a)(2)).
113 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981).
114 672 F.2d 766 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 103 S. Ct. 444 (1982).
115 551 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1982).
116 490 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
'17 Id. at 768.
18 Id
119 489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980).
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tion under Section 17 is that plaintiffs will be unable to circumvent the
express civil remedies of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Such a rationale
a private right of action should not be
was sufficient to satisfy it that
120
17(a).
Section
allowed under
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act was not intended and should not be construed to support a
general implied private right of action. It is not inconsistent with legislative intent, however, to imply such a right under Section 17(a)(1) based
on fraudulent activities which are violative of that subsection. That is
the most reasonable interpretation of the Act.
As previously discussed, '21 a number of courts have held that a general right of action may be implied under Section 17(a) because the provision is "broad enough" to support such an interpretation and because
it is essentially identical to SEC Rule lOb-5, which by the overwhelming
weight of authority supports such an action. The validity of this view,
however, depends upon viewing Section 17(a) in a vacuum - unaffected
and uninfluenced by the remainder of the Act. The standard rules of
statutory construction do not permit such isolated consideration of individual provisions. They must be viewed in conjunction with the remainder of the Act. When the section is so viewed, it compels the conclusion
reached by those courts which have held that Section 17(a) does not imply a general private action. The existence of other sections expressly
calling for civil remedies (particularly Section 12), with restrictions and
limitations placed on those express remedies, shows that to imply a general private remedy under Section 17(a) would enable the statutory
scheme to be circumvented.
Although superficially attractive, the "similarity" argument (z>e. , between Section 17(a) and Rule lOb-5) does not withstand close scrutiny.
That the two provisions are almost identical, and that Rule 10b-5 gives
rise to a private action, supports the proposition that each such provision,
in itsef and standng alone, is broad enough to create an implied private
action. But the two statutes are otherwise different. The Securities Act
has relatively comprehensive express private action provisions; the Exchange Act does not. Thus, there are provisions which restrict the interpretation of Section 17(a) which do not apply to Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5. Accordingly, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, without such restrictions, may be reasonably interpreted to support a general private right of
action, but Section 17(a) which is subject to such restrictions should not
be so interpreted.
120 Id at 1287. In so holding, the court reversed the position it had taken one month earlier

in Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980), where it held that there was an
implied private action under § 17(a) because it is virtually identical to Rule lOb-5.
121 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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It is also not persuasive to argue that a private action under Section
17(a) should be recognized once a right of action is recognized under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The coverage of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 does not extend to every act or activity encompassed by Section
17(a), so that independent utility for a private action under Section 17(a)
may exist. Even absent such an interpretation of the provisions of the
two statutes, however, such an argument is insufficient. As the court
noted in Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc. ,122 it is an adequate refutation
of that argument that the practical significance of denying a private action under Section 17(a) is that plaintiffs will be unable to use such an
action to circumvent the express civil remedy provisions of the federal
securities laws. 123
Although a general implied private action should not be recognized
under Section 17(a), a private suit limited to an action under Section
17(a)(1) based upon fraudulent activities should be recognized. Dorfman
v. First Boston Corp. 124 is persuasive on this point. In Dorfman, the court
noted that civil actions under Section 12 of the Securities Act are not
limited to actions in which redress for fraud is sought. It is only necessary that the plaintiff has been damaged by a misstatement attributable
to the defendant; fraudulent intent is not required. The court concluded
that where a showing of fraud is required for a violation of Section 17(a),
an implied private action free from the limitations of Section 12 should
be recognized because of the more difficult burden of proof associated
with showing fraud. The court pointed out, however, that not all of the
language of Section 17(a) refers to language amounting to fraud. The
court took the position that Section 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, and Section 17 (a)(3 ),
which makes it unlawful to engage in any transaction, practice, or course
of business which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser,
require fraud. Section 17(a)(2), on the other hand, makes it unlawful to
obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading. That subsection does not require fraud
for a finding of a violation. Accordingly, the court concluded that while
an implied action may be maintained under Section 17(a)(2), it would be
subject to the limitations applicable to Section 12.125 Such a holding is
tantamount to saying that a violation of Section 17(a)(2) is subject to
civil redress in a civil action brought under Section 12.
The structure and wording of Section 17(a)(2) and Section 12 are
very similar, but they differ substantially from Sections 17(a)(1) and
122
123
124
125

489 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Kan. 1980).
Id. at 1287. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
336 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 1095. See also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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17(a)(3). This supports the argument that Section 12 effectively provides
a civil action corresponding only to Section 17(a)(2), leaving Sections
17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) without express civil actions. This buttresses the
conclusion of the Dorfman court that these latter two subsections, but not
Section 17(a)(2), should be considered to support an implied private action free from the limitations and restrictions which apply to Section 12.
However, because this conclusion was based in major part upon the
proposition that those parts of Section 17(a) which entail a showing of
fraud should be treated differently from those which do not, it is necessary to examine Section 17(a)(3) a bit more closely.
As previously noted, 126 the Supreme Court has determined that a
violation of Section 17(a)(1) requires scienter, but that a violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) does not. As to Section 17(a)(3), the Court
emphasized that the subsection made it unlawful to engage in a transaction or conduct which would operate as a fraud or deceit. The Court concluded from that language that Section 17(a)(3) focuses on the effect of
particular conduct on investors rather than on the culpability of the person responsible and, therefore, that scienter is not an element of violation
of that subsection. Since fraud necessarily entails scienter, one is constrained by the Supreme Court's decision to conclude that Section
127
17(a)(3) is not a fraud provision.
In suggesting that the most reasonable interpretation of the Securities Act is that Section 17(a)(1) should be regarded as giving rise to an
implied private action based on fraudulent conduct, it is recognized that
some actions which would thereby be possible, could also be brought
under Section 12, since that section, while not requiring fraud for a violation, does encompass activities which do involve fraud. To that extent,
there would be an overlap of remedies. Not all violations of Section
17(a)(1), however, would give rise to an action under Section 12, since
Section 12 is limited to actions based on misstatements or omissions,
whereas Section 17(a)(1), a much broader provision, relates generally to
fraudulent activities.
The interpretation urged here also remains subject to the counteracting argument that Congress provided for private actions to the extent
that it wanted them to exist. Therefore, no additional remedies were
intended. Congress, however, has proscribed different kinds of activities:
some necessarily involving fraud and others involving a lesser degree of
culpability. Congress did not expressly address the question whether a
plaintiff, in seeking redress for activities involving a lesser degree of culpability than fraud, should have a more difficult burden of showing his
right to recovery than a plaintiff seeking redress for fraudulent conduct.
It is suggested, however, that the limitations and restrictions imposed on
126 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
127 But see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1980); Dorfman, 336 F. Supp. at 1095
(§ 17(a)(3) held to be a fraud provision).
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Section 12 actions are more severe than might be expected in actions
based on fraud. Hence, it is reasonable and not necessarily inconsistent
with the express or implied intent of Congress, to imply a civil cause of
action for fraud under Section 17(a)(1), which would not be subject to
the limitations applicable to an action involving a defendant who might
be held liable even though he was not guilty of fraud.
The solution offered is consistent with the philosophy employed by
the Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston. 128 In holding
that an action could be maintained under Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act based upon misrepresentations in a registration statement, notwithstanding the availability of a private action for such misrepresentations
under Section 11 of the Securities Act, the Court in Huddleson pointed
out the difference in scope of coverage of the two sections and emphasized that scienter is required for a violation of Section 10(b). Therefore,
it must be shown for recovery under that Section, but there is no corresponding requirement for a showing of scienter under Section 11.
The suggested solution to the problem addressed herein reflects to
some extent a retreat to the early position expressed by some courts, that
there would seem to be little practical effect of such a solution since, if we
limit implied actions under Section 17(a)(1) to fraud actions, most of the
actions which might be brought in this manner also would be cognizable
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The overlap, however, would not
be complete, because a potential action under Section 17(a) would extend to an action by an offeree, who neither bought nor sold securities,
while a Section 10(b) action is limited to purchasers or sellers.
In summary, the circuits are about equally divided on the question
whether Section 17(a) will support an implied private action. The better
reasoned decisions appear to be those which have concluded that no such
action is available, and the trend seems to be in that direction. This
article suggests that although a general private action should not be recognized, a limited exception should be made. A private action should be
implied for fraudulent activities which violate Section 17(a)(1) of the
Act.

128 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).

